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Abstract
In recent research age distribution e®ects on the current account have been
found in cross-country panel regressions. The reason is di®erent e®ects on saving
and investment from cohort-size variation. In a panel of annual OECD data
1960-1995, we ¯nd that the age e®ects on saving are similar to results on world
samplesbut the e®ects on investment arevery di®erent. The respectiveage pro¯les
of saving and investment are much more similar in the OECD sample. This
may be one factor accounting for the home-country bias found in international
capital markets. Disaggregating investment we ¯nd that young cohorts have a
positive correlation with housing investment while older but still active cohorts
have a positive correlation with business investment.The di®erences in saving and
investment e®ects are, nevertheless, su±cient to generate persistent and sizeable
age e®ects on the current account. Our results suggest that policies concerning
current account balance should take into consideration age distributions and the
degree of development.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, interest in the macroeconomic e®ects of changing population age
distributions has been rising in many countries. New studies have shown that age
e®ects are present in many di®erent macroeconomic time series. In this paper we
address one key issue in this line of research|the di®erent e®ects of age structure
on savings and investment, respectively, and consequently on the current account.
Higgins (1998) shows that in a world sample of countries the peak of positive
age e®ects on investment comes from cohorts in their twenties or early thirties,
while the positive saving e®ect is greatest for cohorts in their forties. This im-
plies quite substantial variations in current account balances with changes in the
age structure of the population. Higgins predicts that population ageing in the
developed world should cause investment to decline more sharply than savings,
thus exerting a favorable upward pressure on the current account and a general
trend towards global capital abundance. Higgins and Williamson (1997) reach
similar results, focusing on East Asia, and Taylor and Williamson (1994) argue
a very similar point when explaining historical capital °ows to the New World.
Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) also report strong age e®ects on the current ac-
count and attributes a substantial part of this variation to variations in public
saving.
In view of the rapidly changing age distributions in many industrialized coun-
tries this has far reaching rami¯cations for macroeconomic stabilization policies
and exchange rate regimes. Policies aimed at current account balance as well as
public budget balance may be seriously misguided and potentially harmful to eco-
nomic e±ciency, if these policies are working against market pressures emanating
from variations in cohort size.
In this paper we show that estimations on annual and ¯ve-year OECD data
also yield substantial age e®ects on the current account. The main di®erence
to Higgins' results is that we ¯nd the peak positive age e®ects on investment
in older age brackets than the positive e®ects on saving. The age pro¯les of
the demographic e®ects on saving and investment that we ¯nd are more similar.
Thus, there is somewhat less impact on the current account.
But the main di®erence is in timing. Our estimates would predict that popula-
tion ageing will cause saving to decline before investment in the OECD countries,
thus partly reversing Higgins' prediction of favorable demographic conditions for
future current account balances in the developed world.
The main factor behind the di®erent age pattern of investment e®ects is a
signi¯cant positive e®ect from the upper middle aged cohorts on business in-
vestment. Higgins, as well as others, have argued that the positive investment
e®ects from young cohorts in the world sample mainly are explained by labor
force growth and maintained capital intensity.
We ¯nd that cohorts in their early twenties do have signi¯cant positive e®ects
on housing investment but not on business investment. Our results suggest that,
2at least in the developed world, household formation and the demand for new
construction is the most important mechanism for positive investment e®ects
from growth in young adults. This mechanism is, however, dominated by positive
e®ects on business investment from the middle aged in the OECD sample.
Age distributions in the industrialized world have large middle age cohorts
while age distributions in the less developed part of the world are highly skewed
towards younger cohorts. This di®erence in distribution is due to the fact that
di®erent countries have entered the demographic transition|to lower mortality
and eventually lower fertility|at di®erent times. Thus, the demographic tran-
sition and the investment results imply that economies during the transition to
industrialization would be expected to display changing age e®ects on the current
account in the course of deveopment.
Developing countries will have huge de¯cits as long as the population is dom-
inated by large young cohorts. When fertility rates have decreased and the popu-
lation starts ageing domestic saving will increase faster than investment demand
and current account surpluses will arise. So far the story agrees with previous
results in the literature. But as the population ages further and becomes dom-
inated by middle-aged cohorts and young retirees saving will tend to decrease
faster than investment and generate current account de¯cits again. In the OECD
countries such a period will occur when the large post-war cohorts start to retire
around 2010. Unless surpluses generated by emerging market economies are large
enough to o®set this tendency it would imply that a world-wide capital scarcity
may emerge at that time.
Of course, these predictions are contingent on currency policies and other
macroeconomic policy measures. If the tendency towards current account de¯cits
is met with high-interest policies or trade-protection measures that depress the
ratio of investment to saving, an actual de¯cit may never materialize. Strictly
enforced budget balance restrictions in the OECD countries might also work in
that direction. It is far from obvious that demographically induced de¯cits or
surpluses in external and internal balances should be counter-acted by economic
policy. These demographic e®ects are, therefore, a serious issue for the discus-
sion around trade policies and exchange rate regimes. Our aim in this paper is,
however, limited to provide some empirical facts to motivate such a discussion,
not to actually initiate it.
Demographic e®ects on savings and the supply of capital has been much more
in focus in economic research than the e®ects on investment demand. While there
is an extensive literature about age e®ects on saving, very little research has been
done on the age e®ects on investment. We, therefore, start in Section 2 with
an examination of the savings evidence. In Section 2 we also present the data
and discuss some econometric issues. Then we proceed to study the empirical
investment patterns in Section 3. Summing up in Section 4 the implications for
current account balances are spelled out and the repercussions on the economy
are discussed. In Section 5 we sum up and conclude our argument.
32 Savings and age structure
Empirical analysis of cross-country aggregate savings data started withLe®(1967),
Modigliani (1975) provides an early summary. Le®'s results were criticized in the
1970's but more recent research has con¯rmed the existence of age e®ects on ag-
gregate saving rates.1 In spite of these results from aggregate studies, leading
economists have questioned the importance of demographic change to explain
shifts in the saving rate. Three main arguments have been advanced. First, in
panel data the variation in age-speci¯c saving rates over time is greater than the
variation in the saving-rate across age groups (Bosworth et al.,1991; Poterba,
1994). Second, using given age-speci¯c saving rates over the life cycle, move-
ments in the population shares of di®erent age groups are too small to account
for observed movements in the saving rate (Bosworth et al.,1991). Third, the age
e®ects on saving rates estimated on aggregate data only explain a small part of
the variation in the saving rate (Bosworth, 1993).
Our results below show that at least the third argument is partially true. Age
structure explains only a small part (less than 5 percent) of the short run varia-
tion in saving rates, but substantially more of the medium-run variation (around
20 percent). Per capita income growth is a much more important determinant of
savings. This would seem to con¯rm the view held by the skeptics that age struc-
ture is a minor factor in macro-economic °uctuations. This skeptical conclusion
is, however, premature for two reasons. First, income growth is in itself strongly
a®ected by shifts in the age structure.2 Second, even if age structure explains
little of the short-run variation it does explain shifting trends in the saving rate
quite well.
It is important to interpretation that consumption smoothing by households is
only one venue for age distribution e®ects on national saving rates. Considerable
parts of the national saving rate are the result of ¯rm decisions taken directly
in connection to an investment decision. Public saving|whether it is the result
of direct political decisions or is caused by automatic responses in revenue or
expenditure systems|is another important component of the national saving
rate.
2.1 Sample and speci¯cation of age e®ects
In all estimations presented below we use cross-country panel data. This serves
to alleviate problems with multicollinearity and omitted variables. Panel data
o®er a possibility to control for country-speci¯c e®ects on saving and investment,
1See for example Mason (1987), Horioka (1999), Weil (1994), Kelley and Schmidt (1996),
Higgins (1998), Miles (1999), and Lindh (1999).
2As shown in McMillan and Baesel (1990), Malmberg (1994), Lenehan (1996), Andersson
(1998) , Bloom and Williamson (1998), Persson (1998), Bloom and Sachs (1998), and Lindh
and Malmberg (1999) .
4due to cultural and institutional di®erences, as well as time-speci¯c e®ects due
to variations in the world business cycle.
2.1.1 Data
A potential problem with panel data is parameter heterogeneity. If age e®ects
di®er between cross-sectional units biased or unstable parameter estimates may
be the result. One way to alleviate this problem is to use a set of countries that
are broadly similar in their institutional set-up and economic history. We use
an OECD-only sample that should su®er less than a world sample from these
problems.3
The OECD sample encompasses 20 of the OECD countries: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (BRD), Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece, Iceland, and
Luxembourg were excluded after some experimentation because, not unexpect-
edly, they showed clear signs of being outliers as compared to the rest of the
sample. Both Greece and Iceland have experienced extreme in°ation episodes,
as compared to the rest of the OECD, while Luxembourg's economy is tightly
interwoven into those of its much larger neighbors. Turkey, Mexico, Hungary,
South Korea and the Czech Republic were excluded beforehand due to lack of
data.
In the basic estimations we use a full set of annual observations from 1960-
1994. Economic data are taken from OECD National Accounts (1997), except
for disaggregated investment data which are from OECD Economic Outlook.
Annual demographic data are from United Nations (1994) starting in 1950.
West Germany is an exception: the UN data refer to the population sum of
East and West Germany so we obtained age structure data for West Germany
3Pesaran et al. (1996) discuss our type of panel with moderate time and cross-section
dimensions and a lagged dependent variable ¯nding that the standard ¯xed e®ects model may
be subject to considerable estimation bias if there is parameter heterogeneity over countries. A
simple remedy would be to estimate time series models for each country and then take the mean
of the parameters as an estimate of the average e®ect. However, this mean group estimator
assumes that the coe±cients of the variables vary randomly across countries, see Swamy (1970).
But in our case one may well suspect that the variation is systematic and dependent on other
variables. One way to take account of systematic variation in coe±cients over countries is
explored in Higgins (1998) who interacts growth variables with the age groups, a speci¯cation
based on Fry and Mason (1982) and Mason (1987) and often referred to as the variable-rate-
of-growth model. A case might also be made that a comprehensive social security system acts
as a substitute for saving. As a proxy government consumption can be interacted with age
structure.
We made the experiment to derive age pro¯les of interaction speci¯cations of the savings
equation calculated using the mean growth rate and mean government consumption in the
sample. These pro¯les were consistent with the patterns reported in this paper although the
relative size of coe±cients were highly sensitive to the interaction variables.
5from Statistisches Bundesamt 1952 to 1996, which were used for the estimations.
Since the age data refer to the 31 December in the given year, we have lagged
them one step to ensure that they refer to the initial age structure of the year
to which averages of economic variables refer. Since we lose one observation in
calculating growth rates our estimation sample adds up to a total of 680 annual
observations. When we use ¯ve-year data there are seven 5-year periods and
thus 140 observations, from which we lose 20 when we include a period lagged
dependent variable. Due to missing data in Economic Outlook the samples used
for disaggregated investment were trimmed for some regressions to avoid inference
problems with unbalanced panels.
2.1.2 Speci¯cation of age e®ects
Regression models with age variables di®er in the way the age e®ects are speci¯ed.
The basic problem is that all age groups cannot be included in the regression since
multicollinearity would prevent identi¯cation of individual coe±cients. Often,
age e®ects are, therefore, represented by a single aggregate measure-for example
population mean age, old agedependency rate(population share of people aged 65
and over), youth dependency rate (share of people aged 0-14) or total dependency
rate (old age plus youth dependency rate). A weakness with this approach is that
only a small part of the total age structure variation that might be relevant is used
in the estimation of age e®ects. In particular, variations in economic behavior
and economic resources that occur during the course of an agent's normal working
life is ignored.
Another approach, pioneered by Fair and Dominguez (1991), is to use a poly-
nomial restriction. The age pro¯le of the demographic e®ects is then restricted
to a low-order polynomial. This is also the approach of Higgins (1998)|see Ap-
pendix A for details. But|as will be apparent below|data may well reject the
polynomial restriction.
A third way to represent the age distribution is to include population shares
for a set of aggregated age groups that captures the most important phases of an
individual's economic life cycle. In comparison to the single-measure approach
this age share approach allows a fuller representation of the age structure. It also
o®ers a more direct and °exible way of estimating age e®ects than the polynomial
approach. Although we prefer this approach it should be noted that it is a
compromise that may be sensitive to collinearity in some cases.
A subdivision into six age groups has been used: children 0-14 years old,
young adults 15-29 years old, mature adults 30-49 years old, middle aged 50-
64, young retirees 65-74 and old retirees above 75 years of age. This general
division can be motivated on theoretical grounds even if the exact delimitation
may be discussed. Children, ¯rst, do not take economic decisions themselves.
Young adults often live single or are still living with parents. In OECD countries
they are also to a high extent still studying and have quite distinct consumption
6habits. Mature adults are raising families, buying homes and starting in earnest
to accumulate wealth. The middle aged are generally past their family years,
have high incomes and are more immediately concerned with their retirement
prospects. Young retirees are no longer working although still rather active and
have started to dissave, at least in terms of their pension claims. The oldest have
considerably more health problems and are more concerned with bequests.
To use the population shares as regressors we have to drop one group due to
perfect collinearity with the intercept. Children is the most likely group to be
simultaneously determined with the saving rate itself. We, therefore, chose to
use that group as reference level.
2.1.3 Annual and 5-year data
We compare our results for the OECD sample with the results presented by
Higgins (1998). He analyzes how age structure a®ects saving, investment and
the current account balance in a world sample using both 5-year average data
and 13-year averages. His data set is based on the Penn World Tables and UN
population data with time series for 100 countries and complemented from other
sources.4
There is a rather strong serial correlation in the dependent variables which is
not accounted for by the independent variables. In studies focusing on the time
series variation of individual countries the use of data with lower frequency than
one observation per year is, in general, not an option. Increases in sample size
due to pooling, however, allow panel studies to use data of lower frequency, for
example averaged over ¯ve years or longer periods as Higgins do. This could be an
advantage if annual data are noisy and is often routinely used with the motivation
that it eliminates business cycles. However, in the presence of serial correlation,
estimates based on, for example, ¯ve-year data should be treated with some
caution, especially if time e®ects are introduced in the speci¯cation. The reason
is that correlation between the averaged and accumulated disturbances and the
likewise cumulated explanatory variables becomes much more likely by the time
aggregation. In a dynamic panel this is further aggravated by the autoregressive
dependent variable. Appendix B discusses these e®ects in formal detail.
We present estimates based both on annual data and on 5-year data. The
reason is, ¯rst, that 5-year data have been used in previous studies and we want
to compare with these results. Second, models based on 5-year data provide
evidence of how the relatively slow-moving age variables a®ect the saving rate
and investment rate over the medium run.
4We did check a world sample, too, using data from the World Bank (World Development
Indicators). In this source data are available also after 1992. In other respects WDI is a poorer
source than PWT. Time series begin only in 1970 as compared to 1950 in PWT and data are
missing for many countries prior to 1980. However, our results on that sample were by and
large similar to those of Higgins, so we did not explore this further.
7Serial correlation both in saving rates and investment rates also raises spec-
i¯cation issues. Our solution, below, to include the lagged dependent variable
may be motivated by for example habit formation theories about saving and con-
sumption which would work to slow down the adjustment to shocks, adjustment
costs in new investment motivates the lag in an investment equation.
2.2 Saving regression results
The gross national saving rate is obtained by adding the current account balance
(exports less imports with net factor income added) to gross investment and
dividing by GDP, all in current prices.5 For comparative reasons we have followed
the parsimonious approach of Higgins (1998) with respect to inclusion of auxiliary
variables. Thus, we include the GDP growth rate per capita and an indicator of
the relative price of investment in both the savings and investment equations.6
In the estimations the GDP growth rate per capita is the ¯rst di®erence of the
logarithm of ¯xed price measures of current GDP less the rate of population
growth computed as the log di®erence of average population in the year. The
relative price of investment is de¯ned as the implicit investment de°ator (both
¯xed capital formation and stocks) divided by the implicit GDP de°ator.
On theoretical grounds, a much broader range of economic variables could be
considered.7 However, in most cases we would encounter a simultaneity problem.
Probably we have a simultaneity problem already with growth and the relative
price of investment. Consistent estimates of these parameters would require in-
5Strictly speaking we should also add in private and public transfers but we wish to retain
comparability with Higgins (1998) who uses this de¯nition, claiming the di®erences are very
small.
6There are several reasons why economic growth should have a positive e®ect in our regres-
sions. First, a short-run positive growth e®ect on saving follows directly from the household's
consumption smoothing. A second possibility is an accelerator e®ect on investment. Third,
in life cycle theory, long-run increases in economic growth is likely to increase the aggregate
saving rate since younger households will face a higher lifetime income and therefore need to
save more in order to smooth consumption in old age. This e®ect is considerably less important
for older households so the growth e®ect follows from aggregation.
The relative price of investment is included because it is part of the relative factor costs
that should determine investment demand. High relative prices should tend to depress relative
investment demand. Unless capital markets are perfectly integrated on the world market this
would tend to spill over on savings, too. On the other hand high relative prices could also be
caused by excess investment demand that would raise saving compensation and thus we might
have an o®setting positive e®ect on saving. Thus a high relative price of investment could have
a positive e®ect on saving but should tend to have a negative e®ect on investment demand. In
practice these e®ects are hard to identify since we only observe the equilibrium outcome.
7We did attempt to use interest rates as a possible proxy for in°ation expectations. Ex
post saving is not the same as ex ante saving, so in°ation could pose a problem. Nominal
interest rates would be expected to re°ect expectations of in°ation. Considerably less complete
observations were then available so results became more unstable and estimates more imprecise.
The general pattern of the age coe±cients remained robust though.
8strumental variables. Good instruments are hard to come by, however, so we
were content to check that IV estimates using lags|as instruments for growth
and the relative price of investment|did not a®ect the age parameters much.
These estimates are available on request but we do not report them here since
our focus is on the age e®ects and we do not believe that the lags are really valid
instruments
We control for country-speci¯c and time-speci¯c omitted variables. It is
not self-evident, though, that these speci¯c e®ects should be considered to be
¯xed. In the panel data literature it is generally asserted that if you wish to
draw conclusions only about the sample at hand|and not about a more general
population|¯xed e®ects is the appropriate model to use, while random e®ects
should be preferred in the converse case. In our case, using ¯xed country e®ects
would thus be correct since we are interested in the age e®ects on savings in the
OECD countries and how they may di®er from those in more extended samples.
In the time dimension, however, our interest goes beyond the sample period and,
therefore, a random e®ects speci¯cation would be more appropriate. But random
e®ects estimates are sensitive to misspeci¯cation so it is prudent to also consider
¯xed time e®ects. Fixed e®ects estimators are likely to be more robust in small
samples (Kiviet, 1995).
We ¯rst present estimation results in Table 1 using both annual data and 5-
year averages of economic variables and initial age shares. Theregressions con¯rm
the ¯ndings made by other researchers that there are signi¯cant age e®ects on the
saving rate. Both estimates with ¯xed and random time e®ects are presented.8
The estimated age e®ects are broadly consistent with a life-cycle savings pat-
tern, even though it is only the middle aged that have a signi¯cant positive e®ect
on saving and the newly retired have a negative or zero e®ect. For the oldest age
group there is a signi¯cant positive e®ect in the ¯xed time e®ects estimates. This
is not altogether unexpected. It is a common ¯nding in micro studies that the
oldest tend to save substantially more than life cycle theory would predict. Even
though some age coe±cients are imprecisely estimated the tests for the impor-
tance of the group of variables as a whole consistently shows that the age group
shares are statistically signi¯cant. For a life cycle explanation one would expect
a clearer positive e®ect from the mature adults, since they would be expected
to have positive net savings, but the signs of the young and mature adults are
ambiguous in this table.9
8The standard errors of the OLS estimations are corrected to be robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation, see Newey and West (1987). In annual regressions the correction allow for
up to 6 lags, in 5-year regressions for lags of 2 periods. The residuals of our regression also show
evidence of fat tails. We therefore computed minimum absolute deviations estimates, which are
less sensitive to outliers, see Huber (1973) . This had little e®ect on the age group coe±cients.
9Using in°ation adjusted saving rates the mature adults have a statistically signi¯cant pos-
itive impact. The measure of in°ation adjusted savings is based on a formal model in Lindh
and Malmberg (1998). This measure implicitly assumes that unanticipated in°ation is equal to
9Dependent variable:
National saving rates Fixed time and Random time and
country e®ects ¯x country e®ects
Annual 5-year Annual 5-year
No of obs 680 120 680 120
Growth 0.347 0.780 0.380 0.903
(11.1) (5.57) (11.7) (7.17)
Relative price of investment 0.003 0.032 -0.005 0.028
(0.46) (1.60) (0.74) (1.39)
Age group 15 to 29 0.019 0.148 -0.058 -0.120
(0.46) (1.19) (1.93) (1.19)
Age group 30 to 49 0.079 0.263 -0.045 0.030
(1.68) (1.96) (1.09) (0.22)
Age group 50 to 64 0.206 0.588 0.134 0.472
(4.79) (4.79) (3.28) (3.92)
Age group 65 to 74 -0.133 -0.410 -0.123 -0.777
(1.58) (1.46) (1.51) (2.89)
Age group 75 and above 0.357 1.248 0.046 0.430
(3.19) (3.97) (0.59) (1.67)
Lagged saving rate 0.746 0.343 0.776 0.462
(25.5) (4.20) (27.7) (6.09)
Adjusted R2 0.698 0.309 0.825 0.425
Â2(5) test of age var: 30.58 38.61 24.27 27.84
signi¯cance level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 1: National saving rates, autoregressive model, 20 OECD country sample
1960-1994. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Absolute t-values in parentheses.
10Estimates on 5-year data yield much stronger age e®ects. The growth e®ect
more than doubles, but although point estimates increase, the relative price of
investment is still ambiguous. The magnitude of the age e®ects increases, in
general by a factor of between two and four. This result is what we should expect
if the annual model is correct, since persistent e®ects become accumulated over
time by the lag of the dependent variable. The lag coe±cient on the other hand
diminishes to the level expected by computing theimpact after ¯ve years using the
annual lag coe±cient. This is reassuring since it con¯rms what we would expect
from the annual autoregressive model, see Appendix B. The joint signi¯cance
of the age variables in the 5-year estimates is even stronger than in the annual
model, in spite of the massive loss of degrees of freedom in the estimations.
The main di®erence in Table 1 is between ¯xed and random time e®ects.
Neither of the estimators are unbiased since we have an autoregressive term.10
The ¯xed time e®ects estimates are more in line with a life cycle pattern with
positive e®ects from mature adults. The di®erence between random and ¯xed
time e®ects estimates of the age pattern is to a large extent a shift in the base
level, i.e. in the country- and time-speci¯c intercepts.
In the random e®ects model the time-speci¯c intercept is treated as random
and estimated using the covariance matrix of residuals from an estimation with
only country-speci¯c e®ects. In the ¯xed e®ects model the time-speci¯c intercept
is treated as a deterministic constant. The random e®ects model is, therefore,
more sensitive to any bias a®ecting the estimated covariance matrix in the ¯rst
step. Since the ¯rst order impact of this is on the estimated intercepts, this
may well shift the level of the coe±cients. Allowing for a shift in base level, the
di®erences in the pattern of the age coe±cients are not very large.
2.2.1 A polynomial speci¯cation
Our way of specifying age e®ects by using a small number of age groups as re-
gressors is not immune to multicollinearity problems. The polynomial approach
is intended to alleviate that problem by restricting estimation to fewer parame-
ters. Checking this also allows a direct comparison of our OECD results to those
obtained by Higgins (1998) on a world sample.
Higgins (1998) ¯nds powerful demographic e®ects on both national savings
and national investment in a world sample. According to his estimates the in-
observed in°ation. Crude though it may be the regression results were stabilized and less sen-
sitive to outliers. But the general pattern was fairly similar to that reported below for national
saving rates. We, therefore, abstain from presenting these results.
10As is well known, dynamic panel estimates are biased by the inclusion of the lag (Nerlove,
1971; Nickell, 1981). This particular bias is, however, inversely proportional to the number
of time series observations for each cross-section unit. Since we have 34 usable time series
observations this is hardly cause for much concern per se. But it does mean that we cannot use
a Hausman test to choose between the two speci¯cations since both estimators are inconsistent
also under the null hypothesis.
11Dependent variable: Fixed e®ects
National savings rate Country Time Both
OECD Higgins OECD Higgins OECD
Table 1 Table 4
No of obs 140 580 140 258 140
Growth 0.804 0.378 0.681 0.454 0.668
(6.62) (5.50) (1.98) (2.10) (4.45)
Rel price of investment -0.027 0.183 0.059 -8.42 -0.004
(1.08) (0.09) (1.52) (6.13) (0.15)
Linear age coe® -0.443 1.54 0.362 0.825 -0.0785
(5.21) (1.87) (0.89) (0.77) (0.67)
Quadratic age coe® 0.061 -0.0951 -0.005 0.0276 0.020
(4.49) (0.68) (0.07) (0.139) (1.05)
Cubic age coe® -0.0024 -0.000481 -0.0012 -0.00616 -0.0009
(3.87) (0.08) (0.40) (0.66) (1.13)
Adjusted R2 0.549 0.782 0.364 0.401 0.115
Â2(3) test of age var: 47.92 25.01 54.04 28.39 8.23
signi¯cance level 0.000 <0.01 0.000 <0.01 0.041
Table 2: Polynomial age e®ects restriction in a 20 OECD country sample 1960-
1994, 5-year average economic data, age data refer to initial year in period. Com-
parison to results in Higgins (1998). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent standard errors in OECD sample. Higgins' standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity. Absolute t-values in parentheses.
12vestment stimulus is strongest from people around the age of 20, whereas the
savings e®ect is stronger for middle aged people.
Are Higgins' results holding up in our OECD sample? In Table 2 and Figure
1 a direct comparison is made between Higgins' savings results11 and the results
obtained using 5-year OECD data with a polynomial restriction on age patterns.
Two features stand out. First, we get considerably less stable and also weaker
e®ects from the age distribution. Second, the savings pattern, although much
weaker (note that the scale is di®erent in the last panel of Figure 1), is similar
except when only country-speci¯c e®ects are taken into account. However, the
peak saving e®ect is at age 50 rather than at 35-39 as found by Higgins.
The individual signi¯cance of the age variables is lost in Table 2 when time
e®ects are included. The age variables are, however, jointly signi¯cant in all
cases. Except for the growth e®ect Higgins' estimated coe±cients are generally
of a higher magnitude. Higgins use growth per worker while we use growth per
capita, but that hardly explains the di®erence in coe±cient magnitudes.
A clue to part of the di®erence is apparent in the third panel of Figure 1.
The e®ects estimated with the age share approach are considerably larger in
magnitude.12 While the span of the polynomial impact in panel 3 of Figure 1
is only about 0.5, the span in the age share coe±cients is over 2.5. This is still
smaller than Higgin's polynomial span of 5 or more, but much more comparable.
The conclusion is, thus, that the smoothing of especially the e®ects of the three
oldest age groups imposed by the polynomial restriction explains much of the
di®erence.
The polynomial approach actually generates much moreserious multicollinear-
ity (!) among the compounded age variables than we get with the age share
variables. The three compounded age variables used in the estimations are very
highly correlated in our sample. Amost all partial correlations are around 0.98-
0.99. This makes it di±cult to obtain reliable estimates of the individual co-
e±cients, since these are liable to be magni¯ed and even shift signs. This is
especially troublesome with respect to the cubic term since the age pro¯le is ex-
tremely sensitive to changes in this parameter. For comparative reasons the lag
of national saving rates is not included in these regressions and thus the residuals
are quite highly autocorrelated, but recall that standard errors are corrected for
that.
11Note that Higgins' ¯xed country e®ects model is estimated on 5-year data, while the corre-
sponding time e®ects model (which he calls the pooled model) is estimated on 13-year periods.
12The coe±cient for the children is estimated by imposing the restriction that all age group
coe±cients should sum to zero, a restriction which is also implicit in the implementation of the
polynomial restriction.
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Figure 1: Age patterns comparing Higgins' polynomial restriction estimates with
the OECD patterns in the two upper panels. The third panel compares the
polynomial restriction pattern with the age share pattern in Table 1, column 2.
143 Investment and the age structure
The discussion about age e®ects on investment in the literature has no similarly
distinguished history as the age e®ects on savings. Although there has been a
somewhat lively debate on age distribution e®ects on house prices13, the impli-
cation that housing investment should respond to demographically induced price
changes has not been generally recognized in the macroeconomic literature. Al-
though planning authorities have always taken the demographics of household
formation into account economists have been rather skeptical, see e.g. Meen
(1998).
But there are also other venues for age e®ects on investment: an in°ow of
young workers requires new investment in equipment to maintain capital inten-
sity; increased productivity through learning-by-doing implies that an increased
proportion of older workers substantially decreases the ratio between capital and
e®ective labor, thus stimulating new investment. The portfolio shift from real
towards ¯nancial assets|that is observed as people get around 50 years of age
and start to prepare for retirement|would also stimulate investment by making
equity ¯nancing of investment easier and cheaper. Public investment on the other
hand should be tied to the dependency burden. Children require schools, elderly
health care in hospitals or other publicly ¯nanced services.
In Table 3 we report the same set of estimations as for savings in Table 1.
The growth e®ect is|somewhat surprisingly|not stronger on investment than
on saving, and in the 5-year estimates actually considerably weaker. The relative
price of investment is ambiguous or positive. The lag of the investment rate
in Table 3 has lost signi¯cance in the 5-year estimates, and diminished much
more than expected from the annual estimates. There is, thus, reason to suspect
that endogeneity may be more of a problem with investment than with saving.
Instead of catching movements along the demand curve we may actually be ob-
serving shifts in investment demand along the supply curve of saving that causes
the relative price to rise with measured investment. This is hardly unexpected
on annual data where a substantial part of the variation is on the business cycle
frequencies, but it is actually strengthened when we use 5-year data. Appendix
B demonstrates why endogeneity bias should become more serious by time ag-
gregation. It also implies that using lags as instruments is unlikely to be e®ective
in getting rid of endogeneity bias.
Point estimates for both young and mature adults tend to be negative. All
these estimates are insigni¯cant, however, and the only signi¯cant estimate for
age group 15-29 is strongly positive. On the other hand the signs of the two
oldest groups tend to reverse as compared with the savings pattern. The e®ect
of middle aged is stronger and quite precisely estimated. The signi¯cance of the
13See Mankiw an Weil (1989) and the ensuing debate in Regional Science and Urban Eco-
nomics.
15Dependent variable:
Gross investment rates Fixed time and Random time and
country e®ects ¯x country e®ects
Annual 5-year Annual 5-year
No of obs 680 120 680 120
Growth 0.537 0.226 0.536 0.387
(16.1) (1.04) (16.5) (1.92)
Relative price of investment 0.008 0.071 0.008 0.061
(0.88) (2.85) (0.83) (2.65)
Age group 15 to 29 -0.038 0.301 -0.027 -0.028
(0.94) (2.77) (0.77) (0.24)
Age group 30 to 49 -0.022 0.055 -0.053 -0.257
(0.46) (0.36) (1.03) (1.75)
Age group 50 to 64 0.235 0.596 0.210 0.448
(4.69) (3.37) (4.43) (2.83)
Age group 65 to 74 0.001 0.477 0.086 0.047
(0.01) (1.66) (0.99) (0.20)
Age group 75 and above 0.011 0.184 -0.001 -0.930
(0.06) (0.29) (0.01) (2.08)
Lagged investment rate 0.798 0.170 0.799 0.163
(26.9) (1.60) (27.3) (1.49)
Adjusted R2 0.714 0.144 0.745 0.368
Â2(5) test of age var: 31.26 22.50 25.61 22.72
signi¯cance level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 3: Gross investment rates, autoregressive model, 20 OECD country sample
1960-1994. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Absolute t-values in parentheses.
16Dependent variable: Fixed e®ects
Gross investment rate Country Time Both
OECD Higgins OECD Higgins OECD
Table 1 Table 4
No of obs 140 580 140 258 140
Growth 0.300 0.328 1.006 0.369 0.226
(1.71) (5.18) (3.28) (2.68) (1.00)
Rel price of investment 0.051 -4.50 0.040 -3.30 0.065
(1.65) (2.95) (1.14) (4.01) (2.12)
Linear coe® -0.373 3.25 -0.299 2.70 -0.143
(3.40) (3.91) (1.03) (4.26) (0.80)
Quadratic coe® 0.049 -0.511 0.068 -0.393 0.030
(3.21) (3.62) (1.52) (3.55) (1.10)
Cubic coe® -0.0019 0.0206 -0.0035 0.0147 -0.0015
(3.11) (3.36) (1.85) (2.90) (1.27)
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.583 0.227 0.255 0.033
Â2(3) test of age var: 35.59 20.08 11.58 24.88 4.15
signi¯cance level 0.000 <0.01 0.009 <0.01 0.246
Table 4: Polynomial age e®ects restriction in a 20 OECD country sample 1960-
1994, 5-year average economic data, age data refer to initial year in period. Com-
parison to results in Higgins (1998). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent standard errors. Absolute t-values in parentheses.
17group of age variables is not in doubt in this case either.
The polynomial restriction estimations reported in Table 4 and Figure 2, show
that the age pro¯le becomes more or less the inverse of Higgins'. He ¯nds a peak
positive e®ect around 20 while we ¯nd a negative minimum in age brackets close
to this. His minimum around 60 corresponds to maxima around 50.
The age variables, however, lose joint signi¯cance when we include both time-
and country e®ects. The low adjusted R2 indicate that the polynomial restriction
is rejected by the data in this case. The corresponding age share estimate in
column 2 of Table 3 is much more secure, even if adjusted R2 is a bit low in that
case, too. Again we see a span of age e®ects that is much more comparable to
Higgins' results when we use age shares rather than the polynomial restriction.
It remains clear, however, that our investment equations give a radically di®erent
age pro¯le in the OECD sample as compared to Higgins' world sample.
The main question these estimates give rise to is then: Why are there such
large di®erences between Higgins' estimates and the OECD estimates when it
comes to investment rather than saving?
3.1 Age e®ects on disaggregated investment
At least two hypotheses could be put forward to explain Higgins' age pattern of
investment. One is that in°ow into the labor force stimulates new investment to
keep the capital-labor ratio up. The other is that young people in the ages where
household formation takes place require very substantial construction investment
in order to obtain housing.
To check whether both or only one of these explanations are consistent with
our data we ran the same regression equations but using components of aggregate
investment as dependent variables. The results are reported in Table 5.14 The
age variables have very distinct e®ects on the components of investment (except
government investment ) but with di®erent patterns. According to Table 5, two
age groups have signi¯cant positive e®ects on housing investment; young adults
on the one percent level and middle aged on the 5 percent level. Private business
¯xed investment, on the other hand, is signi¯cantly boosted only by the middle
aged, 50-64 years.
14The disaggregated investment data from Economic Outlook were trimmed, Portugal lacked
data except for total ¯xed investment, and the Netherlands lacked data for 1960-1968 to sub-
divide private investment into business and housing investment. Several countries also lacked
data for the ¯rst years in the 1960s. We have also checked that data conform to the conven-
tion that total investment less government investment equals private investment, which in turn
equals the sum of business and housing investment. In two cases (the ¯rst decades for Italy and
Canada) we made corrections, and in two other cases we imputed missing private investment
data (the whole series for the United States and the 1960s for the Netherlands). 1991 and
forward data for the uni¯ed Germany seems to have been just added to the older West German
series, but attempts to correct for this had only minor impact so we abstained from correction
in this case.
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Figure 2: Age patterns comparing Higgins' polynomial restriction estimates with
the OECD patterns in the two upper panels. The third panel compares the
polynomial restriction pattern with the age share pattern in Table 3 column 2.
19Dependent variables: Gross Private Gov. Private
Investment rates ¯xed gross gross business Housing
(excl. ¯xed ¯xed gross
stocks) ¯xed
No of obs 680 570 570 540 540
Growth 0.201 0.240 -0.016 0.172 0.068
(6.34) (8.27) (1.86) (6.60) (5.81)
Relative price of invest. -0.029 -0.029 0.003 -0.024 -0.010
(3.10) (3.28) (1.15) (2.93) (3.02)
Age group 15 to 29 0.070 0.064 0.015 0.022 0.050
(2.19) (1.80) (0.88) (0.71) (2.69)
Age group 30 to 49 0.033 0.087 -0.011 0.053 0.036
(0.81) (1.88) (0.47) (1.17) (1.14)
Age group 50 to 64 0.198 0.207 0.023 0.167 0.059
(4.64) (3.98) (1.25) (3.55) (2.00)
Age group 65 to 74 -0.010 -0.077 0.047 -0.063 -0.009
(0.12) (0.87) (1.30) (0.86) (0.22)
Age group 75 and above 0.077 0.094 0.058 0.131 -0.062
(0.51) (0.80) (1.18) (1.38) (1.08)
Lagged investment rate 0.856 0.860 0.889 0.816 0.847
(22.8) (22.2) (35.0) (17.6) (39.42)
Adjusted R2 0.795 0.774 0.799 0.718 0.770
Â2(5) test of age var: 26.87 19.08 6.61 17.13 13.24
signi¯cance level 0.000 0.002 0.251 0.004 0.021
Table 5: Investment rate components. OECD 18-20 countries, annual sample
between 1960-1994. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors. Absolute t-values in parentheses.
20The middle aged have a consistently positive e®ect on private investment as
a whole. One hypothesis could be based on the fact that this age group tends to
transfer wealth from real assets to ¯nancial assets (see for instance Skinner 1989).
This process is likely to decrease the local cost of capital because of home bias in
equity. Another hypothesis is that the middle aged due to experience are more
productive and thus lower the e®ective capital intensity. Unless this is fully can-
celled by higher wage costs it will also decrease the relative cost of capital. Note
that these hypotheses are complementary since they both work to decrease the
relative cost of capital. Our study, thus, cannot distinguish between them. Pre-
vious work on growth regressions lend support to the latter|Malmberg (1994),
Lindh and Malmberg (1999)|who ¯nd this positive productivity e®ect from the
middle-aged. However, this does not exclude a separate e®ect via the other mech-
anism. In fact, Lindh (1999) shows that in a simultaneous equation model the
age e®ects on savings and growth appear to be more or less independent.
The age e®ects on government ¯xed investment are dominated by the oldest
age groups but here the demographic e®ects are statistically insigni¯cant.15 The
only well de¯ned (signi¯cant on the ten percent level) e®ect from the oldest age
group is a negative one on housing investment. This is not unexpected since
studies of age e®ects on house prices generally ¯nd a negative e®ect from this
group. It is consistent with the idea that they are selling o® their houses, moving
to apartments and nursing homes. Increasing mortality with age also contributes.
Each person who dies frees a slot in the housing market without requiring new
investment.
We could also note that the relative price of investment have signi¯cant nega-
tive e®ects on all components of investment except public investment. This leads
us to conjecture that the endogeneity problem with this variable is mainly asso-
ciated with adjustments of inventory stocks|which are excluded in Table 5, but
not in Tables 3 and 4.
4 The current account
The di®erence in age structure impacts on investment and saving translates into
an age e®ect upon the current account, too. Since this e®ect re°ects tempo-
rary imbalances in the economy which corresponds to real behavioral di®erences
among age groups, there is no prima facie case for economic policy to intervene to
correct these imbalances. A country borrowing from abroad to ¯nance investment
demand generated by an age structure with relatively more young retirees than
middle aged in the population is not facing a long-run imbalance. After a decade
or so the relation is likely to reverse as yesterday's young retirees become today's
old retirees, and the relatively sparse middle-aged cohorts replace them as young
15That does not imply that the public sector is unimportant for these e®ects, but the in°uence
may be channeled through the budget balance, rather than accounted ¯xed investments.
21retirees. But, since "temporary" on this time scale is a matter of decades many
economists and politicians will believe that they have been caught in a long-run
dependence on foreign capital. Fixed exchange rate regimes will also get into
trouble since decadal trend changes in in°ow and out°ow of currency are hard to
accommodate.
In Table 6 we report the estimates with the age share approach. This es-
sentially repeats the information already presented in previous tables since the
dependent variable is the di®erence between saving and investment. But the in-
formation is in a more accessible form. Joint signi¯cance for the age variables
on traditional 5 percent levels holds only for the 5-year estimates and the ¯t is
worse than for savings and investment separately.
However, in Table 6 an age pattern emerges where mature adults and the
oldest have positive e®ects on the current account while in particular the young
retirees have a strong negative e®ect. This re°ects the di®erences in investment
and saving patterns with positive savings e®ects for groups with negative or
neutral investment e®ects translating into positive current accounts e®ects and
vice versa. The middle aged who boost both savings and investment, however,
has a neutral e®ect on the current account. Because of these cancellation e®ects
it is the age distribution among the retired people which is most important for
the current account e®ects.
It is tempting to conjecture from these results that the increased demand for
health care among the oldest is a driving force behind both the current account
e®ect and the positive e®ect on savings. Health care services are to a large extent
non-tradable. A shift in demand towards non-tradables should translate into
improved current account balances and consequently increases in the national
saving rates, ceteris paribus. However, that must be left for further research to
investigate.
In Table 7 and Figure 3 we report the current account results when we impose
a polynomial restriction. The weak and unstable e®ects indicate that the polyno-
mial restriction is too harsh on the data. Only in the case with time e®ects and
no country e®ects do the age variables achieve joint signi¯cance, and in that case
we also get a very di®erent pattern from Higgins with the main positive e®ects
from young adults. But the polynomial restriction is unable to accomodate the
strongly di®erent e®ects from the two oldest age groups and averages these to a
more or less neutral e®ect.
The spread of the age coe±cients in Figure 3 is well below 0.5 if we disregard
the children e®ect in the mid panel, but using age shares we again obtain a more
considerable spread and thus a greater impact on the current account. The age
share estimates seem overall more reliable so in relation to Higgins' predictions
we, thus, would predict worsening of the average current accounts in OECD as
postwar baby booms start to retire in the beginning of the next millenium but
some decade later they will grow older and induce a recovery at about the time
when Higgins' would expect a worsening.
22Dependent variable: Fixed time and Random time and
Current account/GDP country e®ects ¯xed country e®ects
Annual 5-year Annual 5-year
No of obs 680 120 680 120
Growth per capita -0.186 0.523 -0.167 0.358
(4.74) (2.21) (4.58) (2.23)
Relative price of investment -0.005 -0.041 -0.009 -0.051
(0.50) (1.30) (0.83) (1.71)
Age group 15 to 29 0.043 -0.104 -0.031 -0.184
(0.90) (0.74) (0.76) (1.68)
Age group 30 to 49 0.101 0.229 0.052 0.135
(1.49) (1.15) (0.81) (0.71)
Age group 50 to 64 -0.040 0.009 -0.050 -0.149
(0.63) (0.04) (0.96) (0.99)
Age group 65 to 74 -0.146 -0.792 -0.274 -0.795
(1.21) (2.38) (2.46) (3.04)
Age group 75 and above 0.364 1.086 0.118 0.716
(1.41) (1.33) (1.01) (2.39)
Lagged current account 0.782 0.176 0.785 0.249
(20.7) (1.56) (20.6) (2.47)
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.126 0.603 0.388
Â2(5) test of age var: 10.16 17.04 9.10 30.97
signi¯cance level 0.071 0.004 0.105 0.000
Table 6: Current account balance, autoregressive model, 20 OECD country sam-
ple 1960-1994. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Absolute t-values in parentheses.
23Dependent variable: Fixed e®ects
Current account/GDP Country Time Both
OECD Higgins OECD Higgins OECD
Table 1 Table 4
No of obs 140 580 140 258 140
Growth 0.504 0.05 -0.325 0.0701 0.442
(2.57) (0.07) (1.47) (0.34) (1.84)
Rel price of investment -0.078 -4.32 0.019 -5.13 -0.068
(2.17) (2.04) (0.62) (4.06) (1.81)
Linear coe® -0.070 -1.71 0.661 -1.85 0.064
(0.85) (2.04) (2.16) (1.86) (0.37)
Quadratic coe® 0.012 0.416 -0.072 0.414 -0.011
(1.00) (2.86) (1.56) (2.22) (0.40)
Cubic coe® -0.0005 -0.021 0.0024 -0.0205 0.0006
(0.83) (0.03)¤ (1.20) (0.02)¤ (0.48)
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.696 0.327 0.214 0.050
Â2(3) test of age var: 5.21 20.87 36.98 16.58 2.88
signi¯cance level 0.157 <0.01 0.000 <0.01 0.411
Table 7: Polynomial age e®ects restriction in a 20 OECD country sample 1960-
1994. 5-year average economic data, age data refer to initial year in period.
Comparison to results in Higgins (1998). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors. Absolute t-values in parentheses.
*This may be misprints. The coe±cient is marked as 1% and 5% signi¯cant, respectively,
although the absolute t-statistic is given as 3.26e-2 in the ¯rst case and 2.36e-2 in the second.
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Figure 3: Age patterns comparing Higgins' polynomial restriction estimates with
the OECD patterns in the two upper panels. The third panel compares the
polynomial restriction pattern with the age share pattern in Table 6 column 2.
25The impact of the age distribution on the current account is not directly im-
plied by the coe±cients, since the growth of one age share is always accompanied
by decreases in other age shares. We have to take the movement in the whole dis-
tribution into account and also compensate for the fact that mortality naturally
dampens the increase in older age groups.
To give some feeling for the impact that ageing will have on the OECD coun-
tries current account balances we have computed the average impact of future
¯ve-year changes in the age shares as projected by UN (1994). In Figure 4 the
two panels graph the implied direct impact of age distribution changes, ignoring
the feed-back through the lag. The upper panel with ¯xed time e®ects give a
somewhat more optimistic view of future impacts using the estimates in coulmn
2 of Table 6. The random e®ects estimator in column 4 of Table 6 di®ers mainly
with respect to the base level. But the direction of change is consistent in both
cases and it is mainly the di®erence in the intercepts of the two equations that
accounts for the shift in impact pattern.
In the computation we have used the assumption that the age coe±cients sum
to zero in order to recover the impact of children. Although this is a conventional
way to do it, we are not quite comfortable with it. In fact the assumption implies
that a uniform distribution will have zero e®ect which is rather ad hoc. The
baseline of zero impact in the graph thus should not be too literally interpreted.
It is the pattern of an upward demographic pressure in the next ¯ve years that
is then replaced by a sustained downward pressure that is of importance. The
projections for the last quarter century up to 2050 should be regarded as purely
illustrative since the precision of even demographic forecasts at that horizon is
near non-existent. The upturn re°ects an assumption of progressive ageing that
may well be sti°ed by rising fertility, rising mortality or immigration from devel-
oping countries.
The computations do not constitute forecasts of the average current account
balance, since we have not taken into consideration the development of other
variables nor the dynamic impact of the changing age distribution. Figure 4
oonly shows the magnitude of the direct age impact on the current account given
that the estimated relation does not change. Although more modest than the
impacts of 5-6 percentage points of GDP on the world scale predicted by Higgins'
estimates16 the spread is still around 2 percentage points of GDP in the OECD.
In absolute numbers this is more than comparable with Higgins' e®ects since
income is so much higher in the OECD countris. Anyway, the e®ects are clearly
large enough to merit attention from policy makers and forecasters.
Thus, we would expect that the average OECD country for the moment is
experiencing a current account surplus or at least diminishing de¯cits. This
will go on up to around 2010 when the trend reverses due to the large postwar
16In Higgins (1998) Table 7 predicts a positive age e®ect on the current account both in
OECD and the rest of the world up to 2010 of around 3.2 percentage points.
26Predicted average impact on current account/GDP
Direct effect from age share changes in 5-year periods

































Figure 4: Impact on OECD countries current account balances 1995-2050 ac-
cording to 5-year estimates using UN population forecasts. E®ects have been
averaged over countries and the dynamic e®ects through lags are not accounted
for.
27cohorts starting to retire. The downward trend continues up to between 2020 and
2025 where the "age cycle" turns again. However, it should be stressed that age
structure in a regression sense explains only a minor part of the current account
°uctuations. Business cycle variation around this trend may make the outcome
in any given year deviate considerably from the age trend. Exchange rate and
trade policies will also in°uence these deviations from the underlying pressure.
4.1 Some interesting points for future research
There is an empirically established home-country bias: saving and investment
tends to be tighter correlated than would be expected in view of the capital
mobility on international capital markets. This phenomenon has been the focus
of much debate since the seminal Feldstein and Horioka (1980) article. This so
called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle has generated many both empirical and theoreti-
cal papers since it was interpreted to imply a lack of capital mobility that was at
odds with the integration of international capital markets. In an early assessment
of the evidence Frankel et al. (1986) pointed out that the correlation seemed to
be higher in industrialized countries and higher after 1973 than before.
Our results may give a contribution to an explanation of this empirical fact,
although it has little to say on the question of whether the correlation re°ects
capital mobility. Since the age e®ect patterns of saving and investment are pretty
close, even if not wholly overlapping, variations in saving and investment in a
country would tend to correlate even if capital markets were completely free.
The underlying variation in age structure would tend to coordinate movements
in investment and saving independently of each other. Juxtaposing our results
with Higgins a reasonable guess is that this should hold to a higher extent for
developed countries.
Coakley et al. (1996) ¯nd in an OECD panel that saving and investment coin-
tegrate and that this explains the Feldstein-Horioka correlation between saving
and investment. Although they give another explanation for this cointegration
in terms of a solvency constraint, it would be interesting to explore age structure
coordination as an alternative explanation for the cointegrating vector.
Another interesting fact is that Lindh and Malmberg (1998) ¯nds that in-
°ation is correlated to age structure changes with a pattern that is exactly the
opposite of the one we ¯nd for the current account. The same basic economic
forces that transmit the age e®ect to the current account via di®erences in e®ects
on saving and investment could would also cause aggregate demand e®ects that
would increase absorption and drive di®erential changes in the price level. If pur-
chasing power parity holds, this would then need to be re°ected in real exchange
rates.
If this can be empirically veri¯ed it is something that will have implications for
the choice of exchange rate regimes and currency areas. Di®erent movements in
the age structure of countries would be re°ected in adjustments of their exchange
28rates. This is another interesting topic for future research.
5 Summary and conclusions
We have here explored the empirical relation between saving and investment
on the one hand and the age distribution of the population on the other hand
in a sample of OECD countries. Our results con¯rm previous studies on other
data samples in that we ¯nd a statistically signi¯cant relation, which explains a
considerable fraction of the long-term variation when due consideration is given
to the persistence and cumulative nature of the e®ects. But we ¯nd that in the
OECD there is much less di®erence between the peaks of the age patterns of
investment and saving, respectively.
The reason for this di®erent result is the much older population in the OECD
countries as compared to the world sample used by Higgins (1998) and the East
Asian sample used by Higgins and Williamson (1997). Disaggregating investment
we ¯nd that increases in the middle-aged population mainly stimulates private
business investment while increases in the young working population mainly in-
creases housing investment. Since household formation and the acquisition of
own housing is concentrated at the ages of young adults the latter e®ect is not
unexpected. There are also good reasons to believe that a younger population is
more mobile and migrates much more readily into growing urban areas.
The positive e®ect of the middle-aged population on business investment
might seem more puzzling, but at least two reasonable|complementary rather
than competing hypotheses|could be put forward. If labor e±ciency increases
through learning-by-doing an ageing working population will decrease the ratio
of capital to e®ective labor. This stimulates investment if factor prices remain
constant. The supply of experienced labor will actually increase so their relative
wages would tend to decrease but labor market rigidities would lead us to believe
that this counteracting e®ect is of little importance.
It is an established fact that people generally shift their portfolio from real
assets, predominantly real estate, towards more liquid ¯nancial assets as they
get closer to retirement. This would increase the part of total wealth available
for investment and thus stimulate investment by decreasing ¯nancial costs. This
would also tend to eliminate the counteracting e®ect of possibly decreasing wages
on the productivity mechanism and might even strengthen it.
Further research on these issues is, of course, needed. Such research would
also serve to clarify whether the strong focus on consumption smoothing and
household decisions in explaining aggregate saving might have been misdirected.
Clari¯cation of the impact of age structure on these variables will also contribute
to long-term forecasting since age structure is one of the very few explanatory
variables which we can project for several years ahead and still be rather con¯dent
that the uncertainty is manageably small.
29The results here also give rise to two other interesting conjectures. First, that
some part of the home-country bias puzzle can be explained by age structure
coordination of the demand for investment and the supply of saving. Second,
that trend movements in real exchange rates may be driven by di®erences in the
age structure of countries.
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32Appendix
A Polynomial restrictions on age coe±cients
Estimation of age e®ects under a polynomial restriction is similar to an Almon
(1965) lag speci¯cation. We ignore other explanatory variables here and assume
that the population age shares, skt; for the cohort k years old at time t, are
the only explanatory variables in a linear regression model for some dependent
variable, yt, with a residual error of ut:




Imposing the assumption that the age share coe±cients ak = p(k) for some
polynomial p taking age (or mean age) of the group as argument we can construct
a set of new explanatory variables by aggregation of the age groups. Since it is
impossible to identify the intercept separately from the coe±cients of a linear
combination of age group shares we also impose the further assumption that
the ®k sum to zero. This implies that a uniform age distribution will have no
net e®ect on yt: In principle the polynomial could be of any degree and thus be
¯tted to any pattern of age coe±cients. In practice only second or third degree
polynomials are used. We use a third degree polynomial like Higgins (1998):
ak = °0 + °1k + °2k
2 + °3k
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The zero sum restriction is used to get rid of the constant by elimination.
n X
k=1












and we get the following speci¯cation to estimate




































33A large number of age parameters to estimate can thus be replaced with a more
parsimonious set of polynomial coe±cients. The constant °0 can be recovered
under the zero sum restriction.
34B 5-year time aggregation
In this appendix we show formally how time aggregation will a®ect estimation
results when we use 5-year data given that the true model is an annual autore-
gressive speci¯cation. To keep it simple we only consider how some dependent
variable yt relates to one explanatory variable xt and an error term ut:with no
constant. Thus the "true" annual model is
yt = ®yt¡1 + ¯xt + ut



























From this expression we can deduce
1. If ® < 1 the autoregressive coe±cient will diminish with ¯ve-year data. In
fact, if ® = 0:8 then ®5 = 0:32768:
2. Our residuals in the 5-year estimations will be serially correlated even if
they were not so before.
3. The coe±cient of an explanatory variable ¹ xt¡i would diminish in the same
way as the lag coe±cient provided we used all the appropriate lags of the
averages in the 5-year regression and not encountered problems with the
collinearity between the averages.
4. In practice we use ¹ xt which is correlated with previous averages and possibly
with the errors, too. Taking an extreme case and assuming that ¹ xt¡i = ¹ xt







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
®=0:8
= 3:3616
5. If the explanatory variable is simultaneously determined with the dependent
variable, or more importantly, only predetermined the year before we will
get endogeneity bias in the estimated coe±cient when we use 5-year data
because the average will be correlated with the error, even if that was not
the case using annual data.
35The ¯rst point provides a yard-stick that allows us to say that the coe±cients
on the savings lag in Table 1 are reasonable while the lag coe±cient in Table
3 diminishes too much when we change to 5-year data. Point 2 is by itself no
serious problems since the parameter estimates will remain consistent and the
standard errors have been corrected for serial correlation. However, in conjunc-
tion with point 5 it makes it pointless to use lags as instruments to try to solve
endogeneity problems. Point 3 would be relevant only if the explanatory variables
were stochastically independent, which is clearly not the case. Point 4 implies
that for strongly persistent variables like the age variables a magni¯cation of the
coe±cient with a factor around 3 is quite reasonable.
Point number 5 is obviously of concern with respect to growth and the relative
price of investment in our applications in the text. But it is not innocent with
regard to the age variables either. Although they react rather slowly to economic
changes, the determinants of the age distribution do change. Fertility, migration
and mortality will be a®ected by current economic conditions and with a 5-year
lag those e®ects may be considerable. It is therefore prudent to use initial age
structure in the period instead of the average to avoid the endogeneity bias.
This expedient would not be expected to work well with economic variables
with high levels of high frequency noise like growth. The correlation between
the smoothed dependent variable and the initial value of growth would then be
too low for estimation. But it would be expected to work rather well with slow-
moving age variables, where the high-frequency part in the dependent variable
should not be expected to correlate with the age variables anyway.
However, it does introduce another problem. Using st¡5 instead of ¹ st as





i(¹ st ¡ st¡5)
Age group shares per se are both highly serially correlated and rather highly
correlated between OECD countries so this term is likely to show up either in a
country-speci¯c intercept or in a time-speci¯c intercept in the 5-year estimates.
A conjecture|which we have not veri¯ed|is that a random e®ects speci¯cation,
therefore could be more appropriate in the 5-year estimations since it will not
attribute all of the mean of the residuals to speci¯c intercepts.
36